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The Chimera of Industrial Policy:
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow
Michael Hart*

R

ecessions have a habit of heating up the industrial policy debate in
the United States and Canada. The misery of unemployment and
plant closures, the threats of trade deficits and disappearing industries,
and the apparent inability of governments to effect instant cures act
like clarion calls to the gurus of government planning. Much of their
advice reminds me of a fascinating book about medicine I read recently. It divides the history of medicine into three phases.1
The first, or primitive phase, lasting well into the nineteenth century and in some societies even into the twentieth century, can be
summed up as a direct contradiction of the Hippocratic Oath: doctors
did more harm than good. Because there was no scientific basis for
understanding the functions of the human body and the causes and
course of disease, medicine was a hit and miss proposition. People accepted disease as an ordinary part of life and saw doctors at their peril.
With pure luck, however, the prescribed treatment sometimes worked
and, as a result, medicine men were not wholly dismissed for the
quacks they were.
During the second stage, starting in England in the mid-nineteenth
century and gradually spreading from there, medicine was placed on a
more scientific basis. With advances in research, doctors began to understand the inner workings of the human body and, as a result, to
diagnose and treat disease. In most instances, however, the drugs available to doctors could do little more than help relieve some pain and
suffering and could effect a cure in only a very small number of cases.
On the other hand, the use of antiseptics made it increasingly possible
for patients to survive surgery. These advances added immeasurably to
the prestige of the medical profession and elevated the social status of
doctors to that of clergymen and lawyers. Doctors were no longer doing
harm and sometimes they were doing good.
It is only in the last fifty years that medicine has made such progress that doctors can not only diagnose what ails a patient, but can
* Senior Advisor, Trade Policy Studies, Department of External Affairs and International
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also, in most cases, actually effect a cure. The wonder drugs first introduced during the second world war provided doctors with an arsenal of
weapons capable of wiping out some diseases and curing patients suffering from others. Surgery and related techniques became finely tuned
instruments to effect miracle cures. As a result, the ratio of harm to
good gradually reversed itself. We now appear to be at the threshold of
a new stage and we can reasonably expect preventive measures to wipe
out even more diseases, enabling people to live longer, more productive
lives.
Without belaboring the similarities, I think some interesting parallels can be drawn here between the history of medicine and the state of
industrial policy today. To put it bluntly, I think industrial policy has
reached the stage that medicine had reached about a hundred and fifty
years ago. While it may not be impossible to devise welfare-enhancing,
industry-specific policy prescriptions that would nurture the development of particular industries in a country, the majority of practitioners
still do more harm than good. Like the doctors of that earlier era, the
current gurus of industrial policy are prepared to make extravagant
claims about the wonderful nostrums in their bags but wisely clear out
before the patient discovers he has been had. Although I have my
doubts, I will not dismiss the possibility that perhaps with sufficient
research, information and analysis, we can reach the second stage in
the foreseeable future and be able to use a few targeted, industry-specific policy measures to add to economic welfare. Any hope of finding
precisely targeted policy measures that will work ninety-nine times out
of a hundred, however, is still a long way off.
Despite my misgivings about the claims of the industrial policy
gurus, I will admit that the ongoing academic debate is exciting and
could lead to important new insights. The decade of the 1980s and the
opening years of the 1990s have proven remarkably fecund in giving
birth to new ideas and theories about economic growth, trade, industrial organization and the role of technology. We are also beginning to
see the fruits of multi-disciplinary synthesis of all this work. One of the
burdens of academic over-specialization is that one group of experts
does not sufficiently appreciate the insights of another. Collaborative
efforts are overcoming this problem by, for example, combining the insights of trade and industrial organization specialists. But just as in
medicine, there is a long lag between exciting discoveries in the laboratory of models and theories and their application on a day-to-day basis
as policy. The insights of strategic trade policy may be critical in providing us with a more satisfactory basis for explaining economic growth
2 An excellent introduction to some of the new ideas as well as a good example of the fruits
of collaborative effort is the preliminary outline by Richard Lipsey of his ongoing work on economic growth and policy. Richard Lipsey, Economic Growth: Science and Technology and Institutional Change in a Global Economy, CAN. INST. ADVCD. Ras. 4 (1991).
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and the dynamic effects of trade. 3 Its application to current U.S. or
Canadian trade problems, however, still holds more potential for harm
than good.
With my bias thus clearly exposed, I welcome this opportunity to
discuss the characteristics of industrial policy, its intellectual foundations and its belief system in order to illustrate why the world should be
cautious about putting too much faith in its claims. I will suggest that,
even with all its flaws, a market-based approach to economic development is less likely to do harm than an industrial policy approach.
INDUSTRIAL POLICY: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT

Industrial policy can be a slippery concept to define. Indeed, a
large part of the debate about the desirability of industrial policy is a
definitional one. For a start, it is undeniable that the governments of
advanced industrial countries have a range of policies and programs in
place aimed at promoting the development and maintenance of industry in general, as well as particular industries, within their territories.
In Canada, both the federal and provincial governments provide an alphabet soup of such policies and programs. The tariff, for example, has
for many years been a favorite instrument of industrial policy and the
tariff structure of most countries illustrates which industries were favored at one time or another. Similarly, most governments have learned
how to use grants and subsidies, government procurement, discriminatory product standards, limited access to technology and other forms of
state intervention to favor various industries. Canada first established a
Department of Industry in 1963 and while it has gone through many
name and institutional changes over the past thirty years, Ottawa continues to be blessed with a phalanx of programs, boards, agencies and
officials dedicated to the promotion of particular industries and economic activities. 4
I Strategic trade policy is the work of a group of academic economists exploring the theoretical possibilities of using government policies, such as subsidies, quotas and tariffs, to shift the
gains from trade from one nation to another. In effect, it is a leading branch of modem industrial
policy analysis. See

STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

(Paul

Krugman ed., MIT Press 1987);

RICHARD G. LIPSEY & WENDY DOBSON, C.D. HOWE INST.,
SHAPING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (1987). The arrival in Washington of Laura D'Andrea Ty-

son as President Clinton's chief economist has added new impetus to calls for managed trade. As
one of the most sophisticated advocates of strategic trade policy, her most recent book, LAURA
D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (1992) has become must reading for both proponents and critics of strategic trade policy.

" The extent of such programs was well illustrated by the mine of information collected in
Canada by the Neilsen Task Force in 1984-85. See, e.g., Services and Subsidies to Business:
Giving with Both Hands, March 4, 1984; Natural Resources Program: From Crisis to Opportunity, Sept. 1985; and Agriculture, Feb. 1985. STUDY TEAM REPORTS TO THE TASK FORCE ON
PROGRAM REVIEW (Supply and Services, 1986). On a similar note, Pietro Nivola writes: "The
scope of U.S. industrial policy, past and present, is often underestimated.. . . The commitment of
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Despite the widespread use and long-standing existence of such
programs in Canada, the United States and elsewhere, advocates of
industrial policy insist that neither Canada nor the United States has
an industrial policy or strategy. In most cases this criticism amounts
merely to a complaint that the specific programs the critic favors are
lacking or under funded. In other cases, the criticism is leveled that the
mere existence of a range of policies and programs does not constitute
a strategy. The missing element is an integrative plan that brings the
various programs and policies together into a coherent national strategy
which allows business, labor and government to work together toward a
common purpose. In the United States and Canada, industrial strategy
advocates often assert that Japan and Germany have such an integrated, coherent approach.
Putting aside whether Germany and Japan pursue such an approach, I would submit that both the Canadian and U.S. federal governments, as well as the state and provincial governments, do in fact
put forth an annual statement of their industrial strategy and have
done so for years. It is called the budget. Questions can be raised, of
course, about the degree of coherence evident in North American
budget statements and about the extent to which such statements represent an integrated view of economic or industrial development or
provide a satisfactory basis for a coordinated approach by industry, labor and government. As a matter of record, however, they do represent
the considered view of the political authorities of the moment and often
reflect significant effort by industry and labor to ensure that their interests are advanced or protected. In effect, the budget, in spelling out in
some detail what the government intends - or hopes -

to do about

raising and spending money, amounts to a veritable blueprint or strategy for the economy. 5
Industrial strategy advocates find this characterization of the
budget to be annoying. What they have in mind, they insist, is something else. They want an industrial strategy that spells out those industries which the government believes will, or should, prosper and, therefore, will support and those which the government will not support.
This criticism, however, is also not well founded. In fact, budgets do
spell out exactly what the government intends regarding industrial deresources has been large and enduring." See More Like Them? The PoliticalFeasibilityof Strategic Trade Policy, BROOKINGs REVIEW, Spring 1991, at 14-15.
' In 1981, for example, the Canadian Liberal government's budget for that year set out in
some detail a national industrial strategy based on mega-projects, regional development, and other
interventionist schemes. See ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR CANADA IN THE 1980s (Supply and
Services, 1981). Fewer than four years later, the new Conservative government set out its strategy
in A New Directionfor Canada, an economic statement published in the form of a mini-budget on
November 8, 1984. It posited a different, less interventionist national economic strategy, one that
the Conservative government stuck to with considerablecommitment in the ensuing nine years.
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velopment. If these intentions are not always coherent and clear, the
blame lies in the political need to satisfy many interests rather than in
government's unwillingness to plan with greater precision.
Industrial strategists, of course, contend that a properly constituted plan favors industries with a future and allows industries without
them to gradually wither away. Such a plan has a certain surface appeal. But this kind of rational planning inevitably falls victim to the
reality of the political process. Every industry claims to be a winner; no
one will admit to being a loser. The result is that support often goes to
those with the loudest voices and the most insistent political claims
rather than to those with the most compelling economic arguments.' As
Sylvia Ostry has suggested, in a pluralist democratic society it is not
impossible for governments to pick winners; it is just more likely that
losers will pick the government.' To paraphrase Winston Churchill,
both democracy and the market present no shortage of problems; combining the two seems at times to accentuate their shortcomings. Their
saving grace, however, is that all other forms of political and economic
organization offer even greater problems. For my money, the problems
of both are more easily ameliorated than the much greater horrors that
flow from central planning and authoritarianism. The freedoms guaranteed by the one and the wealth generated by the other provide a setting
that promotes the solution of more human problems than any other
combination.
The quarrel between those who advocate more industrial policy
and those who take a skeptical view, therefore, tends to be more a
question of emphasis and degree than of specific programs. Industrial
policy advocates believe in a large role for government, i.e., political
planning, or what Deepak Lal calls the dirigiste paradigm.8 Critics of
industrial policy assign a larger role to the market and are more comfortable if political direction of the economy is limited to macro programs and policies. They see a role for government but prefer that political decisions be constrained by international and domestic laws of
general application. These are more matters of taste, however, spiced
by experience, than of dispassionate scientific analysis.
While analysis of this market-planning divide is often couched in
terms of capitalism versus socialism, I think it would be more accurate
to acknowledge from the start that all governments in industrialized
countries engage in a significant amount of economic planning, regulat6

Some advocates of industrial policy are prepared to acknowledge this problem. See, for

example, Kevin Phillips, U.S. IndustrialPolicy: Inevitable and Ineffective, HARV. Bus. REV., JulyAug. 1992 at 104-112. While Phillips would like to see a more interventionist approach, he recog-

nizes that industrial policies may do more harm than good in the U.S. political setting.
Sylvia Ostry, Governments and Corporationsin a Shrinking World, Council on Foreign

Relations, 1990, at 58.
8 DEEPAK LAL, THE POVERTY OF 'DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIcS'

5-6 (1985).
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ing and intervening and have done so for most of the twentieth century.
The urge to plan is not limited to socialism. It is more widespread. It is
heir to the planning ideology ushered in during the first world war and
perfected during the second world war. In response to the requirements
of war, both government and industry were organized along military
lines capable of prosecuting and supplying the war effort. The success
of wartime government raised expectations in peace time. Governments
- both politicians and officials - were expected to do things to solve

problems.'
The marriage of this planning ideology to the progressive agenda
of the early twentieth century eventually gave rise to a strong bias in
North America in favor of activist governments determined to solve the
problems that flowed from industrialization, urbanization and mechanization. 10 Large bureaucracies were created to design and deliver an increasing array of social and economic programs and to administer regulations aimed at curbing the excesses of the market and promote a
more equitable distribution of its benefits. Each new program, policy,
and regulation increased expectations and stakeholders as well as bureaucracies with mandates to control and direct some economic activity. As a result, there is now a widely held view, found not only within
bureaucracies and among their political masters but more widely
throughout society, that if there is a problem, governments are a necessary part of the solution." Even the staunchest capitalist does not hesi9 Jan Tumlir, Evolution of the Concept of International Economic Order 1914-1980,
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC POLICY (Frances Cairncross, ed., 1981). This planning
ideology became so pervasive in the 1950s and 1960s that it also became the hallmark of big-firm
capitalism in the United States. As firms expanded and merged into conglomerates, they did so in
part to take advantage of the benefits of planning on a large scale. John Kenneth Galbraith celebrated the triumph of industrial planning in his THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967) and concluded that it would marginalize individual entrepreneurship and the small firm. He argued that
the planning required for modern large-scale production could only be accomplished within large
firms. Within a generation, however, entrepreneurship and the small firm proved to be the most
dynamic element in the North American economy as the deficiencies of the planning ideology
became increasingly clear. Conglomerates proved to be the dinosaurs of the late twentieth century.
Firms with a future were shedding non-essential divisions, buying from outside suppliers and concentrating on what they knew best. The planning burden proved to be too much; the new value
had become flexibility. See JOHN B. CASE, FROM THE GROUND UP: THE RESURGENCE OF AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1992).
10 It is often alleged that Canadians are suspicious of the market and look to government for
solutions while Americans are suspicious of government and look to the market for solutions.
Americans may have a different attitude to the role of government than Canadians, but in both
countries governments have become deeply involved in the economy.
11 The extent to which this planning ideology has become deeply ingrained in our consciousness is well captured by Robert Samuelson: "The modern welfare state . . . touches all of us,
providing us with benefits of various types and claiming a huge part of our incomes. It creates a
vast web of dependency on government that is the ultimate source of huge budget deficits ...
Paradoxically, government's very generosity helps make it unpopular. Government does so much
for so many that anyone can find something that seems wrong or unneeded.. . . The irony is that
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tate to visit Ottawa or Washington, Toronto or Sacramento, to seek
help or relief if his firm is experiencing some problem such as too much
foreign competition.
The impulse for governments to manage and fine-tune economic
development is also grounded in the positivism of the social sciences.
The urge of U.S. academics over the past hundred years to give scientific, mechanistic explanations for the functioning of national economies has led naturally to governments looking for the appropriate buttons to push to influence the direction and detail of economic
development. Encouraged by journalistic probing, public expectations
and academic conceit, governments now routinely claim that they are
in fact managing the economy.1 2 The issue thus is not whether governments should be involved in determining appropriate economic conduct
or in allocating scarce resources; that bridge was crossed many decades
ago. The issues are how, to what extent and to what purpose."
FINDING AN ANALYTICAL TAXONOMY

Against this background, it is easy to appreciate why it is important that before discussion continues, we agree on an analytical taxonomy. I would suggest that we do so by dividing what governments do to
influence the economy into three groups of policies: macro-economic
policies; structural or framework economic policies; and sectoral or
micro-economic policies.
First, macro-economic policy. No one today would deny that governments have an important and legitimate role to play in determining
macro-economic policies. We rely on governments to print money; we
expect them to tax us; and we know that they will spend money on a
wide array of programs. From an industrial policy perspective, the aim
of macro-economic policy is to provide a stable and reliable supply of
money and to keep inflation and interest rates low. Given the increasing
importance of international transactions in today's economy, we not
only expect money to retain its value at home in terms of relative price
stability, but we also want our currency to retain its value abroad.
There are a variety of techniques governments can use to achieve these
objectives which need not detain us in this discussion. While there may
the welfare state arose in the 1930s as an antidote to the insecurities of free markets. More than
50 years later, it has itself become a wellspring of anxiety and contention." Robert Samuelson,
Clinton's Nemesis, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1993, at 51.
1" Charles R. Morris, It's Not the Economy, Stupid, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July, 1993,
at 49-62 explores the influences on policy and politics of a mechanistic view of the national
economy.
"3See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF
THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE

(1992) and DAVID

OSBORNE

& TED

GAEBLER, REINVENTING

(1992) for a discussion of the progressive agenda and its influence on the development of modern bureaucratic government and society's expectations of government.
GOVERNMENT
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be debate about relative priorities, there are few who would suggest
that modern governments get out of this business and let the market be
the sole determinant of macro-economic targets. 4
Second, governments maintain a range of framework policies that
affect the basic structure and functioning of the economy. In marketbased economies, many of these structural policies are aimed at providing a framework within which the market will operate, and the extent
to which we rely on these policies suggests how silly it is to insist that
any economy today operates on a pure market basis. Such policies address, for example, the maintenance of competition, corporate behavior,
investment flows, consumer protection and the operation of labor markets. 5 Again, the industrial policy debate may involve differing views
about the design of such policies and the priority to be assigned to their
enforcement, but not about whether governments should properly pursue such policies.
Third, we come to the broad range of micro or sector-specific policies that governments have introduced over the years, ranging from
product-specific tariffs and quotas to a *iide array of investment incentives and other inducements to private firms and individuals to pursue
particular economic activities as well as direct involvement by governments in the production .and distribution of specific goods and services.
What distinguishes these programs is the high degree of product and
industry-specific targeting involved and the amount of discretion that
can be exercised by the political authorities.
Generally, such sectoral policies assume that there is intrinsic
merit in ensuring that certain kinds of economic activity take place
within national frontiers. Arguments along these lines have been advanced for more than two centuries in various guises. In the United
States, Alexander Hamilton is generally considered to be the father of
these views. He maintained that it was "in the interest of a community
to encourage the growth of manufactures." Government activism favoring producers - read tariffs and subsidies - would strengthen the
country by making it more self-reliant and "by creating a higher
14 Dian Cohen and Guy Stanley, however, make the interesting suggestion that in today's

interdependent global economy, there is less that governments can usefully do about interest and
exchange rates and more that they can harmfully do. They believe we could get rid of the annual
pretense of Ministers of Finance trying to set fiscal and monetary targets. See DIAN COHEN &
Guy STANLEY, No SMALL CHANGE: SUCCESS IN CANADA'S NEW ECONOMY 152-153 (1993).
15 Competition or antitrust policy, for example, has long been an important tool used by
governments to promote industrial structure, with the specific goals shifting in the light of changing fashions and circumstances. In Canada, for example, the traditional more relaxed approach to
competition policy reflected the assessment that international competition encouraged by lowering
trade barriers in many ways achieved the same objectives. More robust antitrust laws and their
more vigorous enforcement in the United States from the 1890s through the 1970s reflected the
fact of a large, relatively closed, continental economy.
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probability of a favorable balance of trade.""6
It is currently fashionable to insist on the merits of "high-tech" or
"strategic" rather than "infant" industries and to find much to worry
about in trade statistics that show a deficit in such sectors. From an
industrial policy perspective, such activities must be promoted and protected by the political authorities because without political intervention,
these activities might disappear or fail to materialize, victims of international trade and competition. Without these activities, national economies will not develop the strengths and advantages needed to survive
in the tough world of international competition. From this perspective,
comparative advantage, the theoretical basis for international trade, is
regarded with some suspicion, either on the grounds of old-fashioned
mercantilism or more sophisticated arguments based on new theories of
international trade.
In addition to these three groups of policies, the industrial policy
debate involves.a fourth dimension. To achieve the objective of strong,
nationally based strategic industries, labor and industry must cooperate
with government in a national effort. Only on the basis of a coordinated, coherent plan actively pursued by all three groups can the economy produce national champions capable of besting the national champions of other nations. Only by besting the national champions of other
countries, will a country be able to extract the rents from international
trade that will pay for social and other programs and that will underwrite future prosperity.
The industrial policy debate thus involves four elements: what is
an appropriate macro-economic stance for governments; how actively
and to what purpose should governments deploy their structural policies; to what extent should governments pursue sectoral policies and to
what extent can government, business and labor be made to work together to achieve an agreed set of goals. While a complete industrial
strategy would require an integrated and highly structured approach to
all three elements, industrial strategy advocates are content in most in-*
stances with boosting the weight given to the third and fourth elements,
with more limited attention paid to ensuring that the first and second
elements are supportive of the goals being pursued by means of industry-specific measures. 17 Additionally, industrial strategy advocates tend
16Quoted by Jonathan Rauch in Now It's Producerism, THE NAT'L J., July 27, 1991 at

1854. Rauch provides an interesting analysis of the new interest in interventionism by liberal
Democrats in the United States.
1 The industry- or sector-specific dimension of industrial policy indicates the extent to which
it has a strong elitist, anti-consumer and pro-producer bias. The pro-consumer dimension of antitrust enforcement, for example, rarely figures prominently in the policy mix promoted by industrial policy advocates. They are not content to let the purchasing decisions of consumers dictate
which industries will succeed or fail; rather, such decisions are best left to more informed planners
who will determine which products have the intrinsic merit that warrants government support.
The record, even in Japan, with its fabled success in industrial planning, gives little comfort to this
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to place the greatest weight on the need to promote manufacturing,

particularly the manufacturing of technology-intensive products. In effect, they would like industrial policy to do for the manufacturing sector what agricultural policy has done for the agricultural sector. It.
would tie government support to the production of particular products
by particular firms. It would pursue trade and industry-specific policies
aimed more at achieving specific, numeric results than at promoting
broader, less specific opportunities.1 8
WHY Now -

GLOBALIZATION AND THE GREAT ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION 19

Fascination with industrial policy in the 1990s flows not only from
age-old mercantilism or new forms of protectionism, but also from fear
of the unknown. Industrial policy advocates prefer the warm shelter of
managed trade to the cold wind of open trade, equality of result to
equality of opportunity. Fear of the unknown is particularly strong today because of the tremendous changes flowing from the transformation of interdependent national industrial economies into a much more
integrated global knowledge economy.
Developments in information processing, communications technology and transportation facilities have erased borders and shrunk distances leading to fundamental changes in business organization and
techniques. The term globalization has been used to capture the international dimensions of this transformation. It involves the rapid and
pervasive diffusion around the globe of production, consumption and
investment of goods, services and capital. Concurrently, we are seeing
the development of what has been called a new economy, based on revolutionary changes in the technology and organization of production
and leading to the virtual disappearance of some industries, the rise of
approach. Neither Sony nor Toyota, arguably among the most successful firms in the world today,
pouring out products with some of the highest levels of consumer satisfaction, was favored by the
planners at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. See, e.g., AKIO MORITA, MADE IN
JAPAN: AKIO MORITA AND SONY (1986).
18 The contrast between these two approaches is well set out in GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER,
THE FREE TRADE DEBATE: REPORTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE
OF AMERICAN TRADE POLICY (1989). Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr. et al., The Last Gasp of GATTism,
HARV. BUS. REV., March-April 1991, at 130-138, provides a provocative view of how industrial
policy advocates would approach trade policy.
1" I explore the themes in this section in greater detail in Michael Hart, The End of Trade
Policy? in GLOBAL JEOPARDY: CANADA AMONG NATIONS 1993-94 85-105 (Christopher J. Maule
& Fen Osler eds., 1993). See Masaru Yoshitomi, New Trends of OligopolisticCompetition in the

Globalizationof High-Tech Industries: Interactions among Trade, Investment and Government,
in OECD, STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 1990S (1991)
for a discussion of how these deveiopments have reinforced traditional political ambivalence towards the costs and benefits of international trade and economic interdependence.
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brand new ones and radical changes in employment patterns. 20
The changing nature of international commerce and the international trade regime illustrates the extent of the changes taking place
and the adjustment pressures these changes are generating. Forty-five
years ago, when the basic framework of international trade and economic rules was negotiated, trade in goods was the main vehicle of economic integration. In 1950, for example, the total volume of world
trade represented about ten percent of world production. The bulk of
this trade consisted of raw materials; most of the rest was made up of
finished products; very little trade involved parts and components. Most
trade involved transactions between unrelated private parties organized
as nationally identifiable companies. The main barriers to trade were
government measures imposed at the border (tariffs and quotas) or differential treatment in taxation and regulatory requirements (e.g., commodity taxes and mixing requirements). Relatively high tariffs helped
to maintain nationally segmented markets for manufactured products.
Exchange rates were fixed, and maintaining a positive current account
position was an important goal of government policy.
In the 1950s, most international economic activity was undertaken
by large, nationally organized firms. Companies designed, engineered,
manufactured, marketed and serviced a range of related products
largely within the confines of the firm. Individual firms were hierarchically organized and many employees stayed with a firm for their full
working lives. Employees felt themselves to be part of their company
and companies felt themselves to be part of a national economy. Most
firms - and their products - had a clearly identifiable national origin
and foreign investment which generally involved the establishment of
miniature replicas of such firms. Foreign direct investment, however,
represented only a small proportion of global economic activity.
Government policy - domestic and international - reflected
these facts of economic life. The GATT, for example, negotiated in
1947-48, assumes trade among national economies pursued by private
entrepreneurs working largely within the confines of national borders.
The GATT regards conflicts that may arise between firms in one country and firms in another as involving national interests that can be resolved through intergovernmental consultation. As negotiated in 1947,
20 A handy introduction to globalization can be found in The Business Implications of

Globalization,INVESTMENT

CANADA WORKING PAPER 1990-V. The gurus of globalization include
ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (1991); MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990); KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN
THE INTERUNKED WORLD ECONOMY (1990); and LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC BATTLE AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE, AND AMERICA (1992). Their competing views

are reviewed by R. G. Harris & W. Watson in Three Visions of Competitiveness: Porter,Reich
and Thurow on Economic Growth and Policy, in JOHN EUTSCH INST., PRODUCTIVITY, GROWTH
AND CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

(T.J. Courchene & D.D.

Purvis, eds.,

1993).
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it conceded the regulation of domestic economic life - competition
policy, for example, or farm income stability - to be largely within the
purview of national governments as long as such regulation did not involve overt discrimination between domestic and foreign products except as provided by the GATT-sanctioned border regime.
Business and government attitudes to international trade also reflected the prevailing economic theory that international trade flowed
from comparative advantage, a relatively static condition based on national endowments of the principal factors of production: resources,
capital, and labor. The trade regime, for example, was based on the
concept that government policies that distorted the most efficient allocation of these factors of production were likely to lower national and
global welfare while the removal of such barriers was likely to raise
them. Similarly, trade and investment were considered to be alternative
ways of pursuing comparative advantage; the establishment of a foreign
branch-plant was thought to replace production in the home country
that would otherwise have been exported to the foreign market. 21
Few of these policy-defining assumptions and characteristics are
valid today. The liberalization of trade, for example, did not lead to
greater inter-sectoral specialization at the national level; rather, we
have seen tremendous growth in intra-sectoral trade as countries have
exchanged cars for cars and steel for steel leading to much higher
levels of international competition in domestic markets than anyone
would have anticipated in the 1940s and 1950s. Trade in goods, while it
has grown twice as fast as production and now constitutes about twenty
percent of world production, is now less important than international
investment and capital flows and exchanges of knowledge and technology as instruments of international economic integration. The value of
world trade in goods - in real terms about five times larger than its
value in 1950 - is now but a fraction of the annual value of capital
movements. Fully a fifth of the value of world trade now consists of
services, and a further proportion involves services imbedded in goods.
Billions of dollars of capital now flow around the world at the
touch of a button. Most major currencies float freely and their values
are adjusted constantly and instantaneously. Capital markets operate
21 While the GATT regime may have reflected these concepts, it was not built on them. Paul
Krugman in Does the New Trade Theory Require a New Trade Policy?, 15-4 THE WORLD
ECONOMY, 423-441 July, 1992, convincingly demonstrates that the GATT system is based on an
enlightened mercantilism that posits that countries have an individual incentive to be protectionist

but can collectively benefit from rule-based free trade. "GATT-think," while popular with officials
and politicians, makes little economic sense. Perversely, however, it can lead to economically sensible policy. GATT negotiations have successfully harnessed the producer biases of most national
trade policies into a set of rules that lead generally to freer trade. The process of getting there has
been described by Martin Wolf as mercantilist bargaining. See Martin Wolf, A European Per-

spective, in

BROOKINGS INST., PERSPECTIVES ON A U.S.-CANADIAN

(Robert M. Stern et al. eds., 1987).

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

Hart-THE CHIMERA OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY

twenty-four hours a day. Currency markets track minute changes in
relative values looking for quick profits. The cost of debt capital is now
relatively uniform around the globe, taking into account inflation and
exchange rates. The necessary institutions and skills organized to make
this fluid, global capital marketwork are hastening the further globalization of the economy.22
The last decade has seen the devastation or reorganization of
traditional industries such as steel, automotive and shipbuilding and the
rise of new industries such as micro-electronics, computer software and
biotechnology. Global corporations and networks involving local and regional firms now rely on a much more fragmented and decentralized
approach to design, engineering, production, marketing and service.
They are organized much more horizontally than their counterparts
from an earlier era and they make much greater use of expertise and
resources outside the firm. They use strategic alliances such as joint
production, R&D and other ventures, licensing arrangements, contracting out and brokering among global corporations and networks as
basic techniques in organizing their activities. As a result, there has
been a tremendous growth in intra-corporate and intra-sectoral trade
and in parts and components as well as an increasing reliance on activities taking place far from corporate headquarters or ultimate markets.
New forms of specialization have resulted in the development of
strategic links between global corporations and local suppliers and distributors on a global basis. The stability in corporate organizations and
relationships that was an integral part of economic life in the 1950s
and 1960s has been replaced by a new premium on fluidity and flexibility. Employees no longer experience the same symbiotic relationship
with the firm, and firms no longer feel any special attachment to political entities. With the reduction and even elimination of traditional border-based barriers 'to trade, political frontiers now bear little relationship to economic frontiers.
Prevailing theories about economic growth and international exchange have also become much more sophisticated and varied and have
robbed governments of the moral and intellectual certitude that characterized the trade regime of the 1950s and 1960s. New ideas about dynamic comparative advantage, the international division of labor, the
complementarity of international trade and investment, the role of
technology, the importance of trade in services, the management and
organization of production, as well as the role of government policies
have challenged the conventional theoretical foundations of trade policy
and made governments less certain about the direction of future domes22 See RICHARD O'BRIEN, ROYAL INST. OF INT'L AFF., GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION:
THE END OF GEOGRAPHY

capital markets.

(1992) for a discussion of the policy implications of global financial and
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tic and -international policies and arrangements.23
THE LATEST FASHIONS: DECLINISM AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

Fear of the unknown and frustration with the growing impotence
of national governments to address national problems in this new global
economy have given the industrial policy debate a new urgency as well
as an ardent nationalist and xenophobic flavor. In Canada industrial
policy is the brew of choice for those strongly committed to increasing
Canadian economic independence. In the United States, it has strong
roots among declinists worried about the United States losing its preeminence as the world's leading political and economic power.
The association between industrial policy and economic nationalism has a long track record in Canada. As early as the mid-1950s,
Canadian economic nationalists worried about the excessive influence
of the United States on the Canadian economy. They advocated the
more rigorous pursuit of made-in-Canada policies aimed at differentiating the Canadian economy from that of its neighbor, boosting Canadian ownership of industry and promoting invented-in-Canada technologies. In response, Canadian governments, federal and provincial, have
traditionally been prepared to adopt a range of interventionist policies
to meet this objective. Regional development, investment, transportation, industrial development and other economic policies have all
sought to knit the country together along east-west lines and create a
bulwark against the natural north-south pull of geography. The fact
that such policies have done little to arrest either the process of globalization and modernization or the continentalization of the economy has
only added fuel to nationalist frustration and to the assertion that Canadian governments have not been sufficiently bold and aggressive in
their pursuit of a distinctive and independent Canadian economic
identity. 4
With the rapid globalization of the economy over the past two decades, U.S. economic nationalists now appear to have been bitten by
the same bug. Like their Canadian counterparts, they rue the loss of
economic independence, the increasing influence of foreign investors
and the growth in imports at the expense of domestic products. 25 Simi25 For a discussion of changing theories to explain international trade and their application to
trade policy, see Krugman, supra note 21. Also helpful are many of the chapters in TECHNOLOGY
AND NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: OLIGOPOLY, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION (Jorge Niosi, ed., 1991).
" For a good analysis of Canadian economic nationalism, see SYLVIA B. BASHEVKIN, TRUE
PATRIOT LOVE: THE POLITICS OF CANADIAN NATIONALISM (1991).
26 The last decade has seen a torrent of declinist literature in the United States with PAUL
KENNEDY'S, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1987) setting the theme and HENRY
NAU'S THE MYTH OF AMERICA'S DECLINE: LEADING THE WORLD ECONOMY INTO THE 1990s
(1990) providing the principal antidote. Contributions by economic and business writers include
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larly, their prescriptions are rooted in a pessimistic assessment of the
ability of the U.S. private sector to compete in the tough new global
economy. Convinced that other governments play a much more active
role in shaping economic destiny, they insist that the United States
must adopt similar policies. As in Canada, however, U.S. economic nationalists are seeking to address phenomena that suggest less a matter
of economic decline and more a matter of rapid economic and social
change flowing from globalization and transformation in the technology
and organization of production. It is not the lack of certain policies that
is drawing the globe together economically, but the inexorable pull of
geography and technology.
As numerous studies have shown, the 1980s marked less an absolute decline in the U.S. economy than a decline in its relative position
as other OECD economies closed the gap between them and the United
States. The huge disparities created by the devastation of the second
world war created an unnatural illusion in the United States that it
would be possible to maintain such a lead for ever, despite the fact that
U.S. trade and foreign policy consciously sought to close this rift as
part of its approach to the challenge of the cold war. The narrowing of
the gap has meant two things: U.S.-based firms are running into much
tougher competition in foreign markets and foreign-based firms are
making inroads into the U.S. market. In short, the current U.S. trade
position does not accord with U.S. psychological expectations. Those
expectations, however, are not based on reality.
It is little appreciated that until the late 1970s, i.e., during the
heyday of U.S. global economic leadership, trade played a minuscule
role in the U.S. economy. For most of that period, exports constituted
less than five percent of U.S. GDP and imports less than five percent of
domestic consumption. Inward foreign direct investment ("FDI") was
even less significant, not approaching two percent until the early 1980s
and only passing four percent at the end of the.decade, after a period
of unprecedented growth.2 6 Most Americans, therefore, grew up at a
time when the U.S. economy was relatively self-contained and little.
touched by foreign competition. Trade policy was more a matter of
geo-politics than of domestic politics.
STEPHEN S.

COHEN & JOHN ZYSMAN, MANUFACTURING

MATTERS: THE MYTH OF THE POST-

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY (1987); BENNETT HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN:
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA (1988); ROBERT KUTTNER, THE
END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE: NATIONAL PURPOSE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AFTER THE COLD WAR

(1991);

NORMAN J. GLICKMAN & DOUGLAS P. WOODWARD, THE NEW COMPETITORS: How FOREIGN INVESTORS ARE CHANGING THE US. ECONOMY (1990); and PAUL KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF
DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS: U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1990s (1992). Michael Prowse in Is
America in Decline? HARV. BUS. REV., July-August 1992, at 34-45 provides a compelling overview
of the intellectual poverty of declinism. Other views can be found in the letters produced in the
next issue under the title How Real is America's Decline? HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992.
26 See GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 25.
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When foreign goods did begin to make inroads, the response was
defensive and protectionist. In the 1950s and 1960s, complaints from
import-competing sectors like textiles and clothing were rewarded with
various kinds of special protection. In the 1970s and 1980s, as the number of import-competing sectors proliferated, the trade remedy system
was strengthened and enlarged to counter what was perceived as the

"unfair" advantages enjoyed by foreigners. Aggressive unilateralism section 301 - sought to address "unfair" barriers to foreign markets.27

The inability of these measures to stem the flood of imports, reduce the

chronic trade deficit and check the rising tide of FDI sucked in by rising demand and burgeoning budget deficits thus gave rise to worries
about the "decline" of the U.S. economy. For many Americans, the
effect of globalization has been nothing less than the rape of U.S. economic leadership by unfair and unscrupulous foreigners.
The validity of U.S. declinism thus depends to a large extent on
Japan and Europe bashing. 28 For some, there is an a priori suspicion
that Japanese and European technological and manufacturing prowess
could not have been achieved on the merits; for others, no matter how
it was done, it denotes something seriously wrong in the United States.
For some, not being number one - by a wide margin no less - means

accepting that doing things differently in other countries is neither
cause for concern nor for penalties. It suggests that there may be some

validity to the claims of foreigners that different circumstances give
rise to different policies, priorities and values. For others, not being
number one can only be explained by the perfidy of others and must be
addressed by stern measures.29 Still others assume that only by adopt27 For a discussion of the political response to rising imports and trade deficits, see ROBERT

A. PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 1929-1976 (1980)
and I. M. DESTLER, INST. FOR INT'L ECON., AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS
(1986). A recent, balanced assessment of the problems raised by the trade remedy system can be
found in PIETRO S. NIVOLA, BROOKINGS INST., REGULATING UNFAIR TRADE (1993). AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND

THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish

Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick, eds., 1991) analyze the problems raised by U.S. section 301.
2 In the United States, Japan bashing has become a major and much admired blood sport.
CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, TRADING PLACES: How WE ARE GIVING OUR FUTURE TO JAPAN AND How

TO RECLAIM IT (1989) provides a typical example. In Canada, there tend to be more Japan emulators than bashers because Canadian economic nationalists would like to replicate Japanese policy in Canada and believe that the economic dominance of the United States and slavish attachment to U.S.-inspired policy and regimes block Canada's ability to adopt a made-in-Canada but designed in Japan - industrial policy. The Canadian equivalent of Japan-bashers are U.S.bashers, the latest example of which can be found in MEL HURTIG, THE BETRAYAL OF CANADA
(1991).
2'9 There are differences between societies, and different social values do have an impact on
economic performance. The U.S. penchant for litigation provides a case in point. The combined
effect of product liability, health care and other forms of litigation presents a huge drag on the
U.S. economy and on its competitiveness, but there is little chance that Congress will legislate
limits to the right to litigate or the size of awards. The media have a wonderful time showing
various victims as shining white knights taking on the rapacious, irresponsible corporation. But

Hart-THE CHIMERA OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY

ing the same policies as Japan and Germany can the United States
hope to catch up. For Lester Thurow, for example, competition between nations is a zero-sum game: one nation's gain is another nation's
loss. The purpose of policy is to ensure that there are more national
winners than losers. The object of industrial policy, therefore, is to try
to stack the deck in favor of national champions so that they will benefit and the champions of other nations will not."0
Lost in the rhetoric is the simple fact that Germany and Japan
and the other countries of Europe and East Asia have been catching
up, benefiting greatly from U.S. trail-blazing and consequently able to
avoid some of the mistakes made by the leader. Following a clearly
marked path is always easier than blazing a new one. Having caught
up, industrialists in all three areas of the global economy are learning
to take advantage of the benefits of a more open global economy - in
part due to U.S.-sponsored trade liberalization - as well as the technological forces accelerating globalization. As a result, firms in every corner of the globe now find their ability to grab and maintain a lead
much more difficult. Rather than the playing field being tilted against
the United States, the long-standing tilt in favor of U.S. firms has finally been overcome and U.S. firms must now learn that competition
will be tougher in all markets, including their own.3 1 The smart ones
have learned to hedge their bets by building an ever expanding array of
intercorporate alliances that spread the risk of innovation, investment
and marketing around the globe among various participants. The result
is a much more integrated and, to an increasing extent, denationalized
global economy.
Greater competition on a global scale provides a direct challenge
to established U.S. institutions and values - firms, governments and
education - suggesting that there are perhaps other, even superior
ways of doing things than the American way. For a country born out of
a sense of mission that its approach is morally superior, this discovery
is traumatic and gives declinism an emotional well-spring to tap.32 At
that corporation may represent the livelihood of thousands of other Americans and the success of

a suit may drive it into bankruptcy. It is one of the prices Americans pay for their system of
government. It is also a price that Americans should be prepared to pay and should not lead to

penalties on imported products produced in societies that do not tolerate such practices.
30 See THUROW, supra note 20.
31 It might be good therapy for more American industrialists to reread J. J. Servan-Schreiher's lament of only a generation ago. See JJ.SERVAN-SCHREIBER'S THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE
(1968). Servan-Schreiber contended that the tilt was so sharp that it might prove impossible for
others ever to catch up.
32 In Canada, U.S. declinism plays to a well developed sense of anxiety about Canadian
identity and proximity to the United States and thus strengthens ever-present anti-Americanism
as well as giving further impetus to the economic nationalist desire for autarky. The Canadian
urge to identify with Europe or Asia, i.e., anything but the United States, is a delusion that tries

to defy the facts of geography and history.
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the heart of declinism, therefore, can be found U.S. preoccupation with
its manifest destiny - a destiny that can only be validated by being
number one. These emotional overtones have tended to obscure the
weak intellectual and analytical underpinnings for much of the debate
on the subject and made much of the literature difficult for non-Americans to appreciate. It has also given the industrial policy debate in the
United States a respectability which experience elsewhere would suggest it does not deserve. Finally, it enhances the risk of U.S. policy
makers missing the real problems and concentrating on solutions that
are unlikely to have much prophylactic effect.
LESSONS FROM THE REAL WORLD: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

There are real problems raised by the globalization of the economy
and the increase in global competition. It means, for example, that lowskilled workers in OECD countries will need to compete with lowskilled workers in the third world on the basis of per-unit cost in the
manufacture of standard-technology and other foot-loose production;
the social implications of this development are profound."3 Similarly, it
means that the rewards of innovation are less sure than in the past
while the costs are higher and the consequences of failure more extreme. That uncertainty undermines the stability and predictability on
which business thrives. Alliance building is reinforcing oligopolistic
practices and undermining the capacity of national competition authorities to protect consumers and a competitive market. Adding industrial
policy to this already difficult set of challenges is more likely to aggravate than alleviate problems. Rather than providing new and better economic opportunities, it is likely to increase inter-firm and inter-governmental conflict.
Such drawbacks might be acceptable if the payoff was clear. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Governments do not have a good track
record of picking winners and losers, but losers have an excellent record
of picking governments. When governments are committed to picking
winners, the losers will show up and insist on their share; the real winners are too busy ensuring the success of the product they make or the
service they provide. Industrial policy - or strategic trade policy inevitably deteriorates into a game won by special interests at the expense of wider consumer or broader national interests. Peter Lilley, former UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, put it very well a
few years ago: ".

.

. interVentionist policies are based on the assump-

tion that government has superior wisdom to that of managers and in33 MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES
FOR PROSPERITY (1984) provided an early analysis of the social implications of globalization. Also
of interest is PAUL LEINBERGER & BRUCE TUCKER, GENERATION AFTER THE ORGANIZATION

MAN (1991).
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vestors. The fact is that when governments have decided to pick winners they have unerringly chosen losers. . . . once governments start
channeling funds to industry, little goes towards new industries, products or processes. The bulk inevitably goes into supporting old, dying
industries. Not so much lame ducks as dead ducks."34
Nevertheless, industrial policy gurus in the United States and Canada continue to insist that the examples of Japan, Germany, Sweden
and elsewhere demonstrate that a coherent and integrated industrial
strategy pays clear dividends. In fact, these appeals are based more on
myth, fanciful reading of the facts and faulty reasoning than on hard
evidence. For example, it is argued that Japan is a successful economy;
Japan pursues industrial policies - embodied in the mystical powers of
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"); Japan
must be successful because of MITI. Actual case studies of successful
Japanese firms and industries tell a different tale. They suggest that
there are complex factors at play but that the influence of MITI and
various industrial policies was more likely to have been negative than
positive. 35
Evidence in Canada, where there have been many experiments in
industrial planning and government intervention, tends to bear out the
Japanese experience. In Canada, industrial policy has had three abiding goals:
e regional development - governments have tried to bring industry to
regions where it does not make much economic sense but where there
are compelling socio-political reasons to expand economic activity.
- diversification of the economy - governments have sought to
broaden Canada's economic base by starting industries where Canada
has failed to demonstrate any comparative advantage.
* research and development - governments have sought to expand the
native technological base in Canada in the belief that more active domestic research and development will help Canadian industry expand
value-added activity.
Billions of dollars of provincial and federal tax dollars have been
Peter Lilley, Speech given to the Institute of Directors, Birmingham, England (April 30,
1991).
'5 The paper by S.Linn Williams in this volume provides a series of examples of both the
myths and the realities of Japanese planning. The MIT study of the world car industry similarly
demonstrated that the success of the Japanese firms was anything but the result of MITI or
industrial policy. See JAMES P. WOMACK, ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD

(1990). Max Holland's study of the machine tool industry, MAX

HOLLAND, WHEN THE MACHINE

A CAUTIONARY TALE FROM INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1989) provides overwhelming evidence of how U.S. policy and managerial ineptness led to the decline in the U.S. industry, and
how private sector drive and initiative, rather than MITI, fueled the rise of the Japanese industry
machine-tool industry. Michael Porter's exhaustive study of national competitiveness, MICHAEL
PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990), turned up very little evidence of
policies that successfully targeted strategic industries, in Japan or anywhere else.
STOPPED:
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devoted to the pursuit of these goals; the results have been meager. The
list of Canadian "winners" picked by federal and provincial governments over the years provides a chilling and depressing testimony to the
benefits of industrial policy: While some ventures may have been technological successes and others have met the goal of generating local
employment, few have been commercial successes. What is particularly
depressing about so many of the Canadian examples is that not only
have they not led to commercial successes, but many have not even met
long-term employment or technological goals. They have at best met
short-term political goals at very large expense to the taxpayer. 6
Although there may be some examples of Crown Corporations or
other government-sponsored ventures in Canada working for a while,
their problem is that when things go wrong, they are not allowed to
bite the dust and fail. Rather, they are propped up and allowed to survive despite wretched management, a precipitous fall in demand, new
competition, or other compelling reasons to admit defeat. Political
judgment is allowed to crowd out board room judgment. Governments
cannot accept failure, the way the market can, because there is always
a political point to be proven. As a result, industrial policy usually
translates into taxpayer-supported boondoggles. Unlike old soldiers,
failed industrial policies rarely fade away. Just because past programs,
policies, boards, agencies or crown corporations could not get the job
done, new governments have not hesitated in insisting that new programs, policies, boards, agencies or crown corporations will do better.
Meanwhile, failed programs and policies are not retired. 7
In addition to rarely meeting their goals, Canadian industrial and
regional development policies have proven a favorite target for U.S.
trade remedy actions, particularly countervailing duties. As a result,
Canadian industry as a whole has had to learn to live with the uncertainty and expense of fighting an increasing number of such cases or
with worrying about when the next case will affect them, their suppliers
or their customers: Senior private sector executives and government officials have spent countless days fighting off U.S. trade remedy cases
instead of spending their time on marketing or more productive new
sO Peter Foster, The New Meddlers, CANADIAN BUSINESS, Jan. 1993, describes a long list of

ventures supported by federal and provincial governments that have all, over time, become burdens to the tax payer, including:
Asbestos Corporation
Bricklin
Canadair
CANDU
Churchill Forest Ind.
deHaviland
Come-by-Chance oil ref.
Consol. Computer
Hibernia
Glace Bay hvy-water plant Matane Pulp and Paper
Mirabel
Novatel
Ontario Hydro
Quintette Coal
Suncor
Sprung greenhouses
Sysco
'7 The reports of the 1984-85 Neilsen Task Force, supra note 4, provide eloquent testimony
to the tenacious hold of old policies and programs; many remain on the books today.

Hart-THE CHIMERA OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY

ideas.3 8
Industrial planning in Canada and elsewhere has merely wasted
taxpayers' money and frittered away scarce managerial and other resources. Within a generally well functioning economy, much of this
waste could be absorbed. The tragedy of industrial planning in developing countries runs much deeper. Not only have governments wasted
scarce resources, but a long history of misguided planning has delayed
and derailed economic development for years to come. The result has
been untold human misery. 39
WARNINGS FROM THE ACADEMY: THE DEBUNKING
OF STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY

Despite the dismal record of practical examples, the industrial policy debate has in recent years been given a shot in the arm from new
theoretical insights into the dynamic effects of technology and production, the organization of production, international trade and investment, the role of learning curves, the nature of the firm, the function of
industrial innovation and adaptation, the role of competition and government intervention and more. The theoretical work of trade economists, the insights of the business-historical school, the work of historians of science and technology and the contributions of experts in
industrial organization have all enriched our understanding of how
wealth is created in a market-based economy. 4° Few theories and policies have been untouched by these new insights from the academy.
Among the more arresting results has been the development of
theories of international trade which underpin what has become known
as "strategic" trade policy. Theoretical work and models demonstrate
that in a world of imperfect competition and oligopoly, it is possible to
shift the benefits of international trade from one firm to another and
from one nation to another by the judicious use of quotas, subsidies or
tariffs without reducing overall global welfare. In other words, strategic
trade policy provides a much improved theoretical basis for the ancient
arguments favoring infant industry protection. By adding the twist of
applying these insights to the protection of "strategic" rather than "infant" industries, the academic community has provided those interested
in industrial policy with a powerful new rationale.
Based on the new theories, all kinds of sophisticated arguments
can be developed to justify strategic policies. Europe's Airbus presents
38 Rodney Grey first worried about the impact on Canadian business and economic development of the U.S. penchant for trade remedies. See RODNEY GREY, INST. FOR RES. ON PUB. POL'Y,
(1982).
39 World Bank economist Pedro Belli provides a catalogue of horrors in Pedro Belli, Global-
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izing the Rest of the World, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1991, at 50-55.
40 For a discussion of some of these new ideas, see Lipsey, supra note 2.
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a good case in point. 4 The subsidies to the Airbus consortium were
justified on the grounds that they:
e offset the past effect of U.S. military aid to Boeing and other U.S.
aerospace firms.
• offset the prohibitive entry costs which were a barrier to the establishment of an industry with great technology and spin-off potential.
It would induce establishment of a thriving aerospace industry as a
center of excellence around which clusters of related industries could
develop, benefiting from its R&D, its management and organizational
learning curves and its supply requirements (products and services).
- offset the higher costs for aerospace customers flowing from Boeing's
near monopoly and the U.S.-based oligopoly of aerospace firms.
In the event, however, the Airbus experience suggested the extent of
the flaws inherent in strategic policy. Instead of meeting the desired
goals,
- it led to both industries - in Europe and in North America - requiring subsidies to survive. Not only did prime contractors need a
constant infusion of government assistance, but so also did suppliers
and others who were part of the production chain.
- strategic alliances within the industry diffused the nationally desired
subsidy effect. The aerospace industry is increasingly a global industry. As a result, Airbus' Asian and North American suppliers benefitted from the largesse supplied by European taxpayers while Boeing's
European and Asian suppliers benefitted from U.S. and Canadian
taxpayer support - hardly the intended political effect.
- the oligopsonistic practices of aerospace customers offset the oligopolistic practices of the supplieis. Rather than being mutually reinforcing, they proved mutually offsetting.
The Airbus example suggests that important as these new insights
were, their practical application left something to be desired. It thus
did not take long for other academic commentators to demonstrate
both the theoretical and practical limitations of strategic trade policy.42
For our purposes, it is the practical limitations that are of greatest interest. At least six such limitations can be identified:
- The imperfections of the political market - No matter how well
intentioned and planned, strategic policy in North America must inevitably meet the test of democratic politics. Political considerations
mean that governments will adopt very broad definitions of what con41

See David J. Teece, Support Policies for Strategic Industries: Impact on Home Econo-

mies, and Luc Soete, National Support Policiesfor Strategic Industries: The InternationalImplications, in OECD, supra note 19.
42 See Klaus Stegemann, Policy Rivalry Among Industrial States: What Can We Learn
From Models of Strategic Trade Policy, 43-1 INT'L ORG., Winter, 1989, at 73-100 and J. David
Richardson, The PoliticalEconomy of Strategic Trade Policy, 44-1 Int'l Organ., Winter, 1990,
at 107-135.
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stitutes a strategic sector or technology, including not only considerations relating to the forward and backward linkages flowing from research and development activity, the benefits of reserving access to
new technologies and the benefits of learning curves but also the political rewards flowing from job creation and regional development, of
helping supporters and punishing critics. In the United Sates, for example, President Clinton, who appears to be attracted to more strategic planning, is rapidly learning the realities of Congressional log rolling which require him to buy off various special interests in order to
achieve a pale reflection of what he wants. In effect, he is being forced
to abandon the high road of strategy for the low road of pork-barrel
politics.
- The inadequacy of information - Picking winners (firms, industries
and technologies) and choosing the right rent-shifting policy require a
vast amount of very up-to-date information. 43 Even with computer reporting, few government agencies have the capacity to collect, collate
and analyze the necessary data. Additionally, in a period when technology is changing rapidly and being diffused at an ever faster pace, it
is hard to conceive of any one technology as being strategic in an
economic sense.44
- The ease of imitation - Strategic policy measures will in most instances prove largely self-defeating if everyone else adopts similar policies. Such policies only work if you can be the first and prevent
others from adopting comparable strategies. The world today is too
open and the flow of information too vast to prevent others from
adopting the same strategies. The net effect will be a downward spiral
of competitive tariffs, quotas, subsidies and other interventionist measures that will reduce the economic
welfare of all nations rather than
5
increase it for one nation.
* The facility with which governments in one jurisdiction can impose
measures that will offset the intended effect of another government's
strategic trade or industrial policy measures - Much strategic trade/
industrial policy can be readily offset through dumping and countervailing duty measures. The rapid diffusion of these procedures in the
1980s has made the successful deployment of industrial policy measures even less likely in the 1990s. As with the previous limitation, the
net effect of strategic trade and industrial policy measures will then
be a downward spiral of offsetting
measures that will lead to a net loss
46
of welfare for all participants.
- The ease with which private firms can evade or frustrate the intended political or economic effect of such measures - The growth in
international strategic alliances and networks tends to defeat so-called
nationally based strategic trade/technology/industrial policies be"' See Sylvia Ostry, Beyond the Border: The New InternationalPolicy Arena, in OECD,

supra note 19, for a discussion of the difficulties in picking the right policy.
"

See Soete, supra note 41, for a discussion of the difficulties inherent in reaching agreement

on what constitutes a strategic industry or technology.
4 Id. at 62-64.
46 Id.
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cause these networks diffuse the benefits more widely, the opposite of
what is intended. Corporations tend to be more flexible than governments. In response, therefore, to nationalist industrial policy urges,
global or multi-national firms are re-organizing into what Luc Soete
calls multi-domestic firms. 47 Global firms, masquerading as domestic
firms, are able to take advantage of various strategic support measures offered by local, regional and national authorities. Indeed, local
authorities do so knowingly because they want to benefit from the externalities provided by these firms - management skills, investment
and technology. National policies that try to limit the benefits of strategic support to nationally based firms are thus defeated by local authorities as well as by the logic of the global economy.
* The fact that the frontiers of economic and political markets are no
longer synonymous - Strategic trade or industrial policy seeks to
give producers located within one political jurisdiction advantages
over those located in all other jurisdictions. Increasingly, however, the
organization of business ignores the inconvenient nature of political
frontiers. Nationally based industrial policies try to deny the fact that
the economy, now operates at three levels: a global level, a regional
level and a local level. What is missing is a national level. Policies,
therefore, that address issues as if there is a national level are likely to
fail and create problems rather than solve them. Ironically, the very
development that has given rise to political pressures to practice strategic trade policy - the globalization of production and consumption
- has also given rise to business practices that make its application
very difficult. Only by tilting against the forces of globalization - and
its benefits - would it be possible to return to circumstances that
would make strategic trade policy somewhat more practical.
Given these practical limitations, advocates of strategic trade or
industrial policies have outlined a series of heroic requirements that
will overcome these flaws. The nature of these requirements, when
stripped of their jargon and pretense, provides in themselves a chilling
indictment of the deficiencies of industrial planning.
- to overcome the imperfections of the political market, it is necessary
to introduce a high degree of central planning and government direction. The inevitable result is authoritarianism. Industrial planners like
to cite the examples of East Asia as proof that planning works. They
pay little attention, however, to the degree of political authoritarianism that accompanied this planning. The political freedoms North
Americans take for granted are, to varying degrees, absent in Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Experience in these jurisdictions suggests that while it is not impossible for governments to play a
constructive role, it is very difficult. Industrial policy, to the extent it
has been tried, has a better track record in authoritarian than in democratic societies, in homogeneous or statist societies than in pluralist
47

Id. at 57-62.
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societies that value individualism. 48
- to overcome the inadequacy of information, a high degree of regulation needs to be imposed on private firms, compelling them to gather
and report high volumes of information, imposing a heavy cost on
firms and undermining their competitiveness.
e to overcome the problems that arise from the ease of imitation and
offsetting policies and measures, trade needs to be managed, i.e., governments need to enter into agreements about how much firms within
their jurisdictions will produce and sell internationally. Given the
complexities of the market, these agreements need constant adjustment, reinforcement and expansion to capture products and firms that
supply the original targets. Industrial policy thus requires managed
trade and rules about results rather than rules about behavior and
equality of opportunity. They lead to fixed-outcome rather than fixedrule regimes.49
* to overcome the us/them problem, governments need to impose strict
controls on trade in strategic products and flows of FDI and the use of
strategic alliances and networks. Such policies are, however, ultimately self-defeating. Some of the policies pursued by the United
States and the EC over the past decade or so have resulted in increases in oligopolistic rents for Japanese firms and increased MITI
involvement in the management of trade and industry in Japan, the
very thing U.S. and EC firms complain about.
The combined effect is to require a massive effort at developing
national command/control economies linked on the basis of managed
trade and investment agreements. The effect of such efforts would in
the end prove self-defeating. Rather than promoting innovation and enhancing national wealth and prosperity, it would create a static world
incapable of generating new wealth and encouraging innovation. It
would not take long for a static economy to degenerate into a stagnant
one.
Experience also suggests that strategic trade and industrial policy
is a mug's game for big countries. It may be possible to identify shortterm benefits that will accrue in a large economy, although these can
be easily eroded on the basis of the factors identified above, but such
policies are a disaster for smaller economies. If they adopt them, the
result will be a less efficient, isolated economy; if others adopt them, it
means they will be cut out of the loop. Smaller countries are rule takers, rather than rule makers. Strategic trade and industrial policy is
48 THUROW, supra note 20, for example, has developed an elaborate set of arguments demon-

strating that East Asian and European "communitarian" capitalism is superior to Anglo-American "individualist" capitalism and that only by adopting the communitarian model will North
Americans be able to compete head to head with Europeans and East Asians.
49 TYSON, supra note 3, sets out a sophisticated rationale for trade management. JAGDISH
BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1990) and THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK (1991) provide a*
spirited presentation of the problems of managed trade.
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thus a profoundly immoral, power-based game. Given the U.S. propensity for arguing at the normative level -

viz the preoccupation with

"fair" trade - there is nothing more immoral than power-based games
that try to deny the benefits of specialization, trade and innovation to

others. Ironically, the most ardent champions of industrial and strategic trade policy are often those with a progressive view on social and

other distributional issues.
A

ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT: THE ELEMENTS OF
GOOD PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE ECONOMY

The emphasis in the above analysis may have given the impression
that I do not believe there is a useful role for governments in promoting
prosperity and competitiveness. Such is not the case. There is a positive
and critical role for governments. But if we are to determine an appropriate role for government, we have to start by recognizing that we live
in a democratic, pluralist, market-based economy and that industrial
policy does not fit well into such a setting. Democracy and pluralism
mean that governments must respond to a wide range of often competing requirements. The solutions lie in finding compromises and in letting the market play a determining role. The market is based on two
mutually reinforcing factors - private ownership and competition. In a
democratic, market-based economy, the role of government thus becomes one of defending private ownership, promoting competition and
providing shelter for individuals - not firms - hurt by the competitive

do to promote these goals? Four things
process. What can governments
50
come immediately to mind:
- First, governments should maintain a hospitable investment climate,
an environment that encourages and rewards initiative and risk-taking. 5 The ingredients for such a climate include a stable currency and
5o

"The best industrial policy is to keep inflation low, real interest rates gently positive and
exchange rates stable. Then people will save and business will be naturally far-sighted - ie, willing to take a chance on investments that might pay for themselves only after many years....
After this, the most promising industrial initiative is to invest in human capital: a well-educated
labor force, able to acquire new skills and adapt to changing demands, is the most valuable asset
an economy can have. And governments need to invest adequately in infrastructure (such as
roads) . . . Macroeconomic stability, education and infrastructure are the elements of a boring
industrial policy that would work." Leader, ECONOMIST, June 8, 1991. Michael Porter sets out
similar views in Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, HARV. Bus. Rav.,
March-April 1990, at 73-93, which sets out in more succinct terms the themes developed in his
book of the same title.
"I "Just as high savings and investment and high R&D are the key to the dynamic evolution
of comparative advantage at the macroeconomic level, the key to such an evolution at the
microeconomic level is competition among private enterprises to sort out extremely risky undertakings in new technologies." Masari Yoshitoni, New Trends of OligopolisticCompetition in the
Globalization of High-Tech Industries: Interactions among Trade, Investment and Government,
in OECD, supra note 19, at 28.
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sound monetary policy and a fiscal policy that rewards entrepreneurship and initiative and ensures the availability of financing. In short,
governments should provide a stable macro-economic framework. In
Canada, that means more common cause between federal and provincial levels of government to attack deficits and eliminate duplication
and offsetting policies. In the United States, it means finding a way
out df the gridlock of special interest politics. In both countries, we
need to intensify fiscal and regulatory reform efforts aimed at making
North America a better place in which private firms can invest and do
business. Unless governments at all levels, for example, control and
reverse the debt and deficit spiral, we will not be able to generate the
wealth that will allow us to maintain, let alone improve, the quality of
life we have come to expect. Government fiscal requirements are placing an increasingly intolerable burden on Canadian and U.S. taxpayers and driving potentially successful firms to offshore locations while
the demands placed on governments to service the national debt are
crowding out governments' capacity to respond to other needs.
• Second, governments need to maintain an enabling rather than crippling regulatory environment. The regulatory requirements imposed
on businesses by all levels of governments are consuming an ever
larger share of the resources of small, medium and large firms alike.
While some of these requirements may once have served important
objectives, many have outlived their usefulness while new requirements sometimes serve questionable needs. Governments at all levels
must become more vigilant about the burdens they impose on the
wealth-creating sectors of the economy and recognize the extent to
which such requirements undermine our capacity to compete at home
and abroad. At the same time, as became clear in the past decade,
simple deregulation did not lead to the best kind of enabling environment. A spate of deregulation, privatization and free trade may have
been necessary to undo the excesses of the past, but such a strategy
does not provide a sufficient basis for healthy economic development.
We have to learn the difference between effective, purposeful regulation and the kind of regulation that flows from political fads and
fashions. 52
- Third, governments should invest in people - in education, health
and training - in order to nurture a population that is healthy, curious and knowledgeable and that has the skills and understanding to
adapt to the challenges raised for national economies by globalization.
82 The communications industry offers many illustrations of misplaced, outdated regulation.
Modern technology, for example, makes it possible to combine telephone and video technology and
provide a powerful form of interactive, two-way communication of data, voice and image. Current
regulatory structures, however, prevent firms from providing such a service. In both Canada and

the United States, bureaucratic inertia frustrates realizing the potential of new technologies, complicated in Canada by misplaced concerns about cultural sovereignty and in the United States by
equally spurious worrying about national security. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE
PROGRESSIvE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE (1992) provides a
provocative basis for rethinking the approach to regulation in a market-based, pluralist
democracy.
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This does not mean spending money governments do not have. It does
mean more coherent and practical coordination of the variety of education and training programs now being offered. Our education,
health care and social programs are consuming an ever larger share of
national resources but are not responding sufficiently to national
needs. In both Canada and the United States, we need to redirect and
reform these programs if they are not to bankrupt us. In some cases,
objectives need to be redefined; in others, more efficient and productive operating procedures need to be introduced; in some, resources
need to be released for more pressing priorities while in others expectations need to be lowered.
- Fourth, governments need to concentrate not only on renewing the
infrastructure of the past but also on building the infrastructure of the
future. For example, government should be a partner in the development of an electronic super highway that will allow businesses across
the country to take advantage of the miracle of instant
telecommunications.
The benefits that will flow to Canadians and Americans alike from
sustainable levels of taxation and regulation dwarf what can be
achieved through the negotiation and implementation of international
trade agreements or the pursuit of trade and investment development
programs. If we cannot maintain an economy and society that will attract and keep productive entrepreneurs, all the rest will have little
impact.
Within these parameters, there is little room for the kinds of activities traditionally considered as industrial policy. Instead, there is room
for an activist trade policy that recognizes that in the more integrated
global economy of tomorrow, the scope for inter-firm and inter-state
conflict is much greater than in the past. Such conflict will seriously
undermine the capacity of governments to govern and industries to generate wealth. In response, we will need to negotiate a new generation of
international economic agreements that build on the trade agreements
of the past but address issues that go far beyond them. We will need to
develop inter-governmental rules dealing with such issues as trade and
the environment, social policy, competition policy, investment, innovation and more. We will need more robust institutional and dispute settlement provisions to reduce the inevitable conflict arising from the
much deeper integration of globalization. In the words of Sony chairman Akio Morita, we need "to begin creating the nucleus of a new
world economic order that would include a harmonized world business
system with agreed rules and procedures that transcend national
boundaries.""3 In effect, a sane industrial policy would start with a set
of global rules that would prevent governments from doing the many
things they know are dumb but which make so much short-term politi11

Toward a New World Economic Order, THE ATLANTIC

MONTHLY,

June, 1993, at 88-98.
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cal sense. It would welcome, rather than reject, a more thorough version of the GATT. It would point governments toward policies and activities that clearly cannot be done by the private sector and let private
capital do what it does best: innovate and take risks.
CONCLUSIONS

We are going through a period of rapid and fundamental change
requiring adjustments in domestic economies and in international regimes and practices. The stresses and strains already being experienced
by existing policies, institutions and procedures suggest that these adjustments need to take place sooner rather than later. International
business policy can no longer be divorced from domestic policies and
vice-versa. The linkages are significant, particularly with respect to investment, innovation, competition policies, labor markets and intellectual property protection. Appropriate bridges need to be designed and
built. Public interest in linking trade policy with traditional non-trade
issues such as the environment and social programs is also leading to
demands for and concerns about greater international policy convergence and coherence.
Within this complex and difficult setting, we do not need experiments aimed at tinkering with the ability of the economy to generate
wealth; rather, we need to let the economy generate the wealth needed
to address these issues and respond with appropriate social and other
distributive policies. If the accent of trade and economic policy shifts
from wealth-generating to wealth-distributing issues, the result is more
likely to be perverse: the more equal distribution of misery rather than
prosperity. Similarly, if governments get bogged down in planning
which economic activities society should promote and which it should
let go, we are more likely to get a stagnant rather than a dynamic
economy.
What to produce, how to produce it and where to produce it are
fundamentally private sector activities. Government policies and programs may prove critical to the success of such activities, but they are
not substitutes for a productive, innovative and efficient firm employing
dedicated and motivated people with a competitive and attractive product or service to sell. Government policies that are most likely to help
such firms are those that proceed from a coherent view of the role and
limits of government policy. Government policies that are least likely to
help such firms are those that try to second guess what private firms
are doing in response to market signals. As noted by one expert on
Japan: "The central lesson of the Japanese industrial policy experience
is not, as some Americans argue, that government 'guidance' of industry works better than traditional market economies. Unfettered supply
and demand determine the direction of growth in Japan at least as
much as they do in the United States. The lesson of Japan is that a
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government can truly aid private industry if and only if it coherently
plans its ordinary activities on the basis of a vision of the economy's
future."54

" Cited in RAY

MARSHALL, UNHEARD VoicEs 279 (1987).

